Bill Wilson Participated in the PA Public Utility Commission En Banc Hearing on Marcellus Shale Jurisdictional Issues, heldin Harrisburg on June 16.
Opening Remarks presented by Chairman James H. Cawley
Vice Chairman, Tyrome J. Christy
Commissioner Wayne E. Gardner
Commissioner Robert F. Powelson
The first panel included: American Gas Association
EQT Midstream, Martin Fritz, President
PA Independent Oil & Gas Assoc., Louis D. D'Amico, President & E.Dir.
Peoples Natural Gas Company, LLC, Morgan O'Brien, Pres. and CEO
There were a few questions from the Commissiones at this point.
The second panel started out almost immediately with Bill Wilson from the Wyoming County Landowner's Group. Bill was referred to by several of those in attendance, and questions were asked of him at many times during the afternoon session.
Besides Bill Wilson, on the afternoon session, the panel included:
DTE Pipeline Co. and Bluestone Pipeline Co. of PA
Christopher Zona, Director, Business Development
Earthjustice, Deborah Goldberg, Managing Attorney
ETC Northeast Pipeline LLC, Gregory Brazaitis,
VP Gov. & State Affairs
An educational meeting was held at Shadow Brook May 11, 2010. We thank First Liberty Bank for sponsoring this meeting. We expect this will be the first of many meetings about pipelines and the next phase we are entering.
The progrBam featured Jim Leonard, and John Lacey. The availability of the expertise of both these gentlemen was gained through our contacts at the National Association of Royalty Owners (NARO).
Jim is a New York State CPA and Certified Minerals Manager. His presentation will relate to "Rents, Royalties, and Taxes",
John Lacey is a Field Consultant and Compliance Inspector, who has worked for the New York State, Department of Environmental Conservation, and as ROW consultant for utility companies and landowners.. His presentation will cover "Gas Pipelines and the Rural Land Resource, Lessons for Landowners".
NARO has been an invaluable resource throughout the natural gas development of our area, and I encourage anyone with interest in the local natural gas phenomenon to join. They have technical expertise available to answer your questions and are the only National Advocate for Royalty Owners. At a time when the federal government is attempting to increase the taxes on your royalties by over 17 % you need to stay informed. Go to www.naro-us.org for more info.
More on Pipelines
The area of most concern in Wyoming county at this time pertains to the need to increase infrastructure, most particularly "Gathering Pipeline" capacity. The issues that were of concern to you as property owners when leasing your oil and gas rights, should be of equal or greater concern when negotiating a pipeline lease.
Understand that you are being asked to grant a right of way (ROW) / easement that will remain on your property forever unless you require that it terminate sooner or the pipeline company abandons it. Your right to access your property wherever and however you wish may be forever impeded unless you require the pipeline company to engineer and bury it in such manner that it will provide unlimited access to it and crossing of it (by heavily loaded equipment, if necessary) at any point along its route. Someday, you may want to build on a location on your property, you either need to ensure that you will be able to build paved driveway, road or even a paved parking area above the pipeline or be compensated for not being able to do that.Make it clear that you will not have to ask where or when you can cross any part of the ROW/ easement Make it incumbent on the pipeline company to engineer it to meet your desires, and if at any future time they feel that the pipeline will not support your desired use, that they will be required to accommodate your desired use AT THEIR EXPENSE, IN A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME.If they can’t do that, then you should seek payment for a loss of that potential use.
The ROW /easement should state the size and principal purpose of the pipeline (eg.16 inch natural gas or 20 inch petroleum products). Statements like petroleum products and other substances should be stricken unless that is the primary purpose. There are different hazards associated with each that will need to be addressed and you should consider the risk when trying to arrive at the appropriate level of reward. Remember there is more to it than a 50 foot strip with no trees or buildings.
There are potential risks to your property's potential value that you must consider. The attachment to this email contains excerpts from over 100 pages of information that was compiled for the Office of Pipeline Safety. For the sake of brevity, some of the excerpts were taken out of context and combined with other excerpts on the same subject, however, in each case it was done so as to attempt to convey the entire content of the area covered. The entire publication is available on line and the title is included incase you want some light reading. By reading the attachment, you will know more about the potential risks than some of the landmen trying to get you to sign contracts. One landman told me there was no danger of explosion since there is no oxygen in the pipeline. Apparently, he forgot about the oxygen in the air around the pipeline.
Another potential impact on your property is from future government imposed setback restrictions. Some localities have implemented restrictions on development along pipelines over and above the width of the ROW. The federal government does not have the authority to impose those type restrictions, so it stipulates that interstate pipeline companies' transmission lines must be built to different standards in areas that have higher population densities. In the military they use the term "acceptable collateral damage" when referring to those in an area that are considered expendable to achieve a desired result. (How many innocent lives will it cost and is the objective worth it).
In spite of what you may be told by a pipeline landman, there is no federal or state regulation that imposes the same level of safety restrictions on Gathering System Pipelines as there is on Interstate Transmission Lines.In fact, in PA there is almost no authority governing the safety of unregulated gathering lines. The following copy of the federal regulation governing natural gas pipeline safety, specifically exempts unregulated onshore gathering systems.PA has not implemented any regulations to fill this gap.In rural areas, such as the vast majority of the Wyoming Co., you, your family, your friends and neighbors, and your property near the pipeline are considered,“Acceptable Collateral Damage.”Your only protection will be afforded by the ROW / Easement contract.The code of federal regulations (CFR) 49 part 192, deals with pipeline safety, below is an excerpt copied from it.
192.1 What is the scope of this part?
(a) This part prescribes minimum safety requirements for pipeline facilities and the transportation of gas, including pipeline facilities and the transportation of gas within the limits of the outer continental shelf as that term is defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1331).
(b) This part does not apply to—
(4) Onshore gathering of gas—
(i) Through a pipeline that operates at less than 0 psig (0 kPa);
(ii) Through a pipeline that is not a regulated onshore gathering line (as determined in §192.8); and
(iii) Within inlets of the Gulf of Mexico, except for the requirements in §192.612; or
Don’t let anyone tell you that the width of the ROW / Easement is sufficient protection for your property.In Virginia a gas line explosion left a charred area over 1000' in diameter. 2 homes were completely destroyed, and numerous others were damaged. The pipeline company paid damages and bought some of the damaged homes. According to a property appraiser from the area, the pipeline company repaired and sold the homes for over 20% less than the appraised value. When realtors do comparables prior to listing other properties, those prices show up.
The standard lease will keep the landowner from building on the ROW, but will allow the gas company to construct or erect equipment and appurtenances as it deems necessary or convenient. Do you want the noise that may be generated by some of the equipment typically found along pipelines?Pipeline companies want to leave the pipeline in place when they abandon the line.Before you allow that, you should realize that when the line is abandoned, the cathodic corrosion protection will cease.Do you want the line and the possible pollutants contained therein (substances not thought to be problematic at this time), left on your property, to be disposed of at your expense?Old fuel tanks that contain residue from government mandated additives are now designated hazardous, and landowners are having to pay for their cleanup.Do you want that liability?
Those of you that signed Wyoming County Landowner leases, negotiated indemnification that continues after the contract terminates, insurance protections, bonding requirements, default recourse, surface damage payments, dispute resolution methodology, contact and coordination requirements,the right to audit, copy, and reviewoperating records,reclamation to original condition and contours at termination, and other stipulations such as the requirement for the Lessee to take into consideration the best interest of the landowner.Those protections are required in a lease where the Bureau of Oil and Gas Management covers the actual drilling (operations) and the required safety of it.They are in an agreement where you will hopefully receive significant monthly payments. Why would you not require similar protection, plus safety of operation requirements in an agreement that may only offer a onetime payment that, up to this point, does not reflect the potential financial consequences?Nobody but you knows if or how you will restrict your activity near the pipeline, due to your concern for the safety of your loved ones.And only you should determine what that loss of use is worth.
Pipeline companies have said that they want to negotiate with individual landowners because each has unique wants and needs.While that is true, it is also true that each individual (with maybe a couple hours of research, at best) is at a negotiating disadvantage, because the individual is negotiating with a company’s legal, financial, operations and administration departments through a representative that has years of accumulated knowledge and experience.For the most part, the contracts that have been signed so far are evidence of that fact.How many individuals even know what a “smart pig” is, let alone how it may help protect their loved ones. Do you know that to decrease the risk ofcollateral damagein more densely populated areas, the government requires, among other things, periodic corrosion inspections and pressures in pipelines to be kept at a lower percent of the “Structural Maximum Yield Strength” (SMYS) of the pipe.Pipelines have to be designed and built to allow the inspections and increase SMYS.Those modifications, that decrease risk of injuries or deaths by decreasing the probability of incidents per mile, are costly.
It’s been said that a company can not afford to implement additional operational safety measures because 1) their revenues are fixed by the government, or 2) shippers, not pipeline companies, determine the rates for transporting gas.First, the government does not set rates for gathering systems and at a public hearing on 22 April 2010, the Public Utilities Commission stated several times that they do not intend to set rates even if given the authority to govern certain aspects of gathering systems.Next, shippers may determine the rates only when there are cheaper alternatives (excess pipeline capacity) or when they are willing to shut in production.The reason that these lines are being built is that there is no capacity.According to published studies, ROW /Easement acquisition costs are the smallest percent of the cost to build a pipeline, averaging 4-7% of the cost of the pipeline,depending on the type and size of the pipeline.
It's true that pipeline construction projects are capital intensive and to entice investors companies must show the long term viability of a project, but granting a ROW /easement for an indeterminate period of time (for a one time payment) is akin to selling your land and all it's potential uses but continuing to pay the taxes.
Since 1992, when FERC required interstate pipeline companies to unbundle (separate) their sales and transportation services and to provide open-access transportation services there have been numerous changes in the regulatory climate and the marketplace for pipeline capacity. As a result, shippers have, on average, delayed committing to and shortened the contracts for transporting natural gas.The result has caused the interstate pipeline companies to apply for rate increases more frequently.
The pipelines proposed for Wyoming County are gathering pipelines and as such the rates that they can charge are what the market will bear.Is the market capable of paying appropriate levels of compensation to landowners to acquire ROW’s in our area, most definitely.Consider that producers pay up to a couple dollars to ship gas to this part of the country.That gas goes through ROW’s that had to be paid for and compressors that keep boosting the pressure to get it here.Now consider that a 20” line at max allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of 1400 psi and mid-point pressure of 600 psi, extending 18 miles downstream from a compressor station is capable of carrying 747 million cubic feet (MMcf) per day.
Gas companies pay for capacity on a pipeline (whether it is by decatherm (MMbtu) or Mcf,1Mcf is approximately 1MMbtu).Each penny per Mcf paid on the line above equals $7470 per day, each dime is $74,700 per day.Each penny per Mcf on the line above equals $415 per mile per day, $151,475 per mile per year.A gas company operating a line like the one above has been offering a onetime payment of $15 /foot for ROW plus $1500/acre for damage.For a 50 foot ROW that equates to $15 X 5280’ =$79,200 plus (50’ X 5280’)divided by 43560’ = 6.06 acre X $1500 = $9,091TOTALING $88,291 PER MILE, YOUR ENTIRE PAYMENT FOR THE LIFE OF THE LINE.
If the company receives only 1 penny per Mcf of the capacity of the line, your payment represents 5.8% of the revenue produced by the line over 10 years.Since ROW costs typically are 4-7% of the construction cost of the pipeline, one could conclude that construction costs of the pipeline will be paid off in 10 years at 1 penny per Mcf of pipeline capacity.
Please consider all these things before signing a pipeline ROW contract. Bill
This study addresses only transmission pipelines—pipelines that carry natural gas and liquids from producing areas to refineries and processing facilities, and then to consumer areas and local distribution systems. It does not address local distribution systems or gathering systems. The term “incident” (rather than “accident” or “event”) is used throughout the report to refer to any release of product from a pipeline, whether or not it results in death, injury, property damage, or environmental damage.
In recent years major pipeline incidents have occurred, and public opposition to the construction of new pipeline rights-of-way has increased. These events have focused more attention on the need to assess carefully and rationally the actual risks associated with living and working in proximity to transmission pipelines and to consider land use controls near pipelines that will allow people and pipelines to coexist in a manner that does not pose undue risk to each other. In December 2002, Congress enacted the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, which requires the Secretary of Transportation, in conjunction with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and in consultation with other relevant agencies, to conduct a study of population encroachment on rights-of-way. The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) in the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) requested the Transportation Research Board (TRB) to assist in meeting this legislative mandate. Specifically, TRB was asked to convene a committee to consider the feasibility of developing risk-informed guidance that could be used in making land use-related decisions as one means of minimizing or mitigating hazards and risks to the public, pipeline workers, and the environment near existing and future hazardous liquids and natural gas transmission pipelines.
Transportation of energy fuels via transmission pipelines is safer than transportation via other modes, but a significant failure can result in loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and environmental damage. In the last 3 years, natural gas transmission pipeline incidents have resulted in an annual average of 6 deaths, 10 injuries, and $20 million in property damage.Excavation and construction-related damage to pipelines remain the leading causes of pipeline failure
LAND USE MEASURES
Awareness is growing among federal agencies and the pipeline industry that risk-based approaches to managing pipeline safety should be considered for the following reasons:
·The exposure to hazards associated with proximity to transmission pipelines carrying various commodities involves significant uncertainties.
·More people are living and working closer to transmission pipelines.
·Some new transmission pipelines will be constructed in densely populated areas.
Recently, OPS implemented the Integrity Management Program, a regulatory approach that requires pipeline operators to comprehensively assess, identify, and address the safety of pipeline segments that are located in areas where the consequences of a pipeline failure could be significant. However, this effort does not incorporate land use measures (e.g., comprehensive plans, zoning, and setbacks) that could be employed to manage the risks because such measures are primarily the responsibility of state and local governments.
Under such a definition, the most common land use measures employed to preserve the integrity of pipelines involve actions taken by pipeline operators to create, inspect, and enforce their own pipeline rights-of-way. Pipeline companies typically negotiate easements with individual property owners that give the pipeline operator authority to use the rights-of-way for construction and operation of the pipeline, including the right to repair and maintain it. The authority of pipeline operators to control the use of the right-of-way is determined by the terms of the easement agreement; control does not extend to any property not covered by the easement/license.
Some states set land use policy or mandate various kinds of land use and development regulation to protect against natural hazards.Most local governments do not address pipeline issues. For those that do, there are few or no standards on which to base zoning ordinances and other development regulations. Although there is a lack of risk-based technical guidance for making land use decisions near transmission pipelines, the committee noted that much can be learned from hazard mitigation management techniques and strategies that have been adopted by state and local governments in other areas.However, state and local officials lack guidance for pipelines, other than rules of thumb and existing practice concerning appropriate setbacks.
RISK-INFORMED GUIDANCE
While there is a general recognition that pipelines pose a hazard to people, property, and the environment, the extent of the danger is not well understood. Risk is inherent in the pipeline system—it can be reduced and managed, but it cannot be eliminated. Risk assessment practice attempts to answer the following questions.1. What can go wrong?2. How likely is it?3. What are the consequences?
Effective use of a risk-informed approach requires an understanding of the relevant factors and the relationships among these factors.In a risk assessment, which is a systematic and comprehensive approach, the likelihood of initiating events, as well as the likelihood of the various outcomes that may result from each initiator, is a concern.A national-level effort is needed to develop a risk-informed approach and provide an appropriate level of abstraction that is easy to understand and use at all levels of government.
For the pipeline system, there are many stakeholders—policy makers, planners and system design experts, pipeline workers, local officials, property owners, residents, pipeline companies, and trade associations. They all should be knowledgeable about the risks so that informed guidance can be provided. Involvement and a shared commitment among these interested parties, effective communication, training, and procedures can make managing the risks associated with pipeline operations more effective. A well-thought-out risk management framework that measures the risks and identifies a set of risk mitigation alternatives would facilitate discussions among the stakeholders.
FINDINGS
1.Pipeline incidents have potential for significant impact on life, property, and the environment.
2.Just as transmission pipelines pose a risk to their surroundings,so does human activity in the vicinity of pipelines pose a risk topipelines. These risks increase with growth in population, urbanareas, and pipeline capacity and network.
3.Land use decisions can affect the risks associated with increasedhuman activity in the vicinity of transmission pipelines.
4.Pipeline safety and environmental regulation have generally focusedon (a) the design, operation, and maintenance of pipelines and(b) incident response. They have not directed significant attention tothe manner in which land use decisions can affect public safety andthe environment.
5.For the most part, state and local governments have not systematically considered risk to the public from transmission pipeline incidents in regulating land use.
6.Risk-informed approaches are being used effectively in otherdomains (e.g., natural hazard mitigation, industrial hazard mitigation, nuclear reactor and waste disposal programs, tanker safety).
These techniques are also being used to address other aspects ofpipeline safety (e.g., pipeline integrity), but they have not been usedto make informed land use decisions.
7.Currently, decision makers lack adequate tools and information tomake effective land use decisions concerning transmission pipelines.
8.Many different forms of pipeline easements are in effect, and theterms and conditions vary widely. To the extent that an easementlacks clarity, enforcement of the right-of-way is more difficult.
9.Encroachments and inappropriate human activity within the right-of-way can adversely affect pipeline safety. There appears to be variability in the quality and extent of inspections, maintenance, andenforcement of rights-of-way.
CONCLUSIONS
Conclusion 1. Judicious land use decisions can reduce the risks associated with transmission pipelines by reducing the probabilities andthe consequences of incidents.
Pipeline safety is a shared responsibility. Land use decisions and control of activities and development near transmission pipelines may be undertaken by the pipeline operator, safety regulators, state and local officials, and the property developers and owners. Rational land use decisions that provide appropriate physical separation between people and pipelines could reduce the risk.Possible land use techniques include, for example, establishing setbacks; regulating or prohibiting certain types of structures (such as schools, hospitals, and apartment buildings) and uses near transmission pipelines, And legitimate exercises of the local jurisdictional police power.
Conclusion 2. It is feasible to use a risk-informed approach to establish land use guidance for application by local governments.
Various forms of risk-informed management of pipeline safety are already in wide use within the pipeline industry. Moreover, the integrity management regulations governing liquids and natural gas pipelines recently promulgated by OPS require private operators to prioritize enhanced risk-reduction efforts by using risk assessment.
The probability of failure of any transmission pipeline is a function of several distinct but interrelated factors including materials of construction, fabrication, corrosion, effectiveness of pipeline coatings and cathodic protection systems, pressurization, and depth of cover adjusted to account for local conditions. The possible consequences of an event could be estimated on the basis of the product carried, degree of pressurization, depth of cover, surrounding development, and other considerations. The appropriateness and acceptable cost of various measures to reduce probability and consequence could be derived from local values.
Conclusion 3. The federal government could serve a useful role by providing leadership in the development of risk-informed land use guidance for application by local, state, and federal governments.
Because of the numerous stakeholders concerned about pipeline safety and their divergent interests and the national breadth of the concerns, the federal government may be best positioned to initiate an open process of developing risk-informed guidance.Local governments generally lack the resources and incentives to undertake such an effort on their own. The advantage of consistent guidance across jurisdictional lines also argues for federal leadership.
RECOMMENDATIONS(For the sake of brevity only recommendation 1. is included)
Recommendation 1. OPS should develop risk-informed land use guidance for application by stakeholders. The guidance should address
·Land use policies affecting the siting, width, and other characteristics of new pipeline corridors;
·The range of appropriate land uses, structures, and human activitiescompatible with pipeline rights-of-way;
·Setbacks and other measures that could be adopted to protect structures that are built and maintained near pipelines; and
·Model local zoning ordinances, subdivision regulations, and planning policies and model state legislation that could be adopted forland uses near pipelines.
Although relatively few fatalities and injuries are due to pipeline incidents in the United States each year, such incidents occur almost daily. Most state and local governments do not perceive transmission pipelines to be a significant hazard unless pipeline incidents resulting in death, injury, or extensive property damage have occurred in their communities. Nevertheless, some communities that have experienced or been affected by a serious pipeline incident consider pipeline safety to be an important issue that is currently not adequately addressed
Awareness is growing that risk-based approaches to managing pipeline safety should be considered, for the following reasons:
·The exposure to hazards associated with proximity to pipelines carrying various commodities is not well established.
·More people are living and working closer to transmission pipelines.
·Some new transmission pipelines will be constructed in densely populated areas
The remainder of this chapter provides information on the safety record of pipelines,
Edison, New Jersey
On March 23, 1994, a 36-inch-diameter pipeline owned and operated by Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation ruptured catastrophically in Edison Township, New Jersey, within the property of Quality Materials, Inc., an asphalt plant. The force of the rupture and of natural gas escaping at a pressure of about 970 pounds per square inch gauge excavated the soil around the pipe and blew gas hundreds of feet into the air, propelling pipe fragments, rocks, and debris more than 800 feet. Within 1 to 2 minutes of the rupture, the gas ignited, sending flames upward 400 to 500 feet. Heat radiating from the massive fire ignited several building roofs in a nearby apartment complex. Occupants, alerted to the emergency by noises from escaping gas and rocks hitting the roofs, fled from the burning buildings. The fire destroyed eight buildings. Approximately 1,500 apartment residents were evacuated. Although none of the residents suffered a fatal injury, response personnel evacuated 23 people to a local hospital and another estimated 70 apartment residents made their own way to hospitals. Most of the injuries were minor foot burns and cuts resulting from the hot pavement and glass shards as residents fled the complexThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the probable cause of the rupture was mechanical damage to the surface of the pipe, which reduced its wall thickness and created a crack that grew to critical size over time. Contributing to the accident was the inability of the pipeline operator to promptly stop the flow of natural gas to the rupture. The postaccident investigation revealed “teeth marks” on the pipe possibly caused by excavation equipment. Further excavation of the site exposed a great amount of debris around the pipe including a crushed Ford Ranger pickup that had been reported stolen in 1990.
(Source: NTSB 1995.)
Carlsbad, New Mexico
At 5:26 a.m., August 19, 2000, a 30-inch-diameter natural gas transmission pipeline operated by El Paso Natural Gas Company ruptured adjacent to the Pecos River near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The released gas ignited and burned for 55 minutes. Twelve persons who were camping under a concrete-decked steel bridge that supported the pipeline across the river were killed and their vehicles destroyed. Two nearby steel suspension bridges for gas pipelines crossing the river were extensively damaged. According to El Paso Natural Gas Company, property and other damages or losses totaled $998,296. According to NTSB, the probable cause of the rupture and subsequent fire was a significant reduction in pipe wall thickness due to severe internal corrosion. Contributing to the accident were ineffective inspections that did not identify deficiencies in the company’s internal corrosion control program.
(Source: NTSB 2003.)
Information from federal pipeline safety regulators, representatives of pipeline companies, and local officials provided to the committee over the course of its meetings indicated a few examples of actions taken by local governments. For instance, some only allow the lowest-density development around transmission pipelines and locate walking paths, bike paths, and recreational areas along pipeline rights-of-way. Some local government proposals have gone considerably further, often in reaction to spills and explosions.Bellingham, Washington, and Austin, Texas, ordinance examples illustrate common actions to establish large setbacks in response to pipeline accidents and new uses for existing pipelines.The examples from Bellingham and Austin, expand setbacks on an existing right-of-way or easement by limiting what a property owner may do with his or her property.
Establishing an appropriate setback would not be a simple task. Consider the following:
·Rights-of-way/setbacks for high-pressure natural gas transmission and hazardous liquids pipelines would have to be wide to minimize risk as a result of a high-consequence event and therefore could be costly if interpreted as a regulatory “taking” requiring compensation to property owners.
·A cost-benefit analysis of setbacks wider than current practice has not been conducted.
·Setbacks based on, or informed by, some level of risk assessment could be complex to account for given the variation in product, pipe dimensions, pressurization, depth of cover, and related characteristics.
·Local governments generally prefer simple, rather than complex, regulatory approaches. Increased land and housing costs reduce the number of households that can afford to purchase homes—by 424,000 for every $1,000 increase in the price of a new home costing $100,000 or more (Emrath and Eisenberg 2002). In some cases, this adverse effect can be avoided if localities provide adequate housing densities in areas not at risk from pipeline accidents.
New requirements may render many existing homes nonconforming, a status that could reduce their value and inhibit their opportunity to make improvements.Thus, there are many practical and cost implications of introducing setbacks significantly greater than already exist.
Government Requirements for Pipeline Operators:
49 CFR 192, which applies to natural gas pipelines, defines area classifications on the basis of population density in the vicinity of a natural gas pipeline and specifies more rigorous requirements as human population density increases. A class location unit is defined as an area that extends 220 yards, or 1/8 mile, on either side of the centerline of any continuous 1-mile length of natural gas pipeline (49 CFR 192.5). Class locations are categorized by the extent and type of development within the boundaries— the more dense the development, the more stringent the requirements. There are four area classifications:
Class 1.
Locations with 10 or fewer buildings intended for human occupancy;
Class 2.
Locations with more than 10 but fewer than 46 buildings intended for human occupancy;
Class 3.
Locations with 46 or more buildings intended for human occupancy or where the pipeline lies within 100 yards of any building or small, well-defined outside area occupied by 20 or more people during normal use; and
Class 4.
Locations where buildings with four or more stories above-ground are prevalent.
Natural gas pipelines constructed on land in Class 1 locations must be installed with a minimum depth of cover of 30 inches in normal soil or 18 inches in consolidated rock; pipelines installed in navigable rivers, streams, and harbors must have a minimum cover of 48 inches in soil or 24 inches in consolidated rock. Pipelines in Class 2, 3, and 4 locations must be installed with a minimum depth of cover of 36 inches in normal soil or 24 inches in consolidated rock. In addition, pipe wall thickness, pipeline design pressures, hydrostatic test pressures, maximum allowable operating pressure, valve spacing, frequency of inspection and testing of welds, and frequency of pipeline patrols and leak surveys must conform to higher standards in more populated areas. According to API (2004), 48-inch cover over pipelines is required where a vehicle crossing is to be made for axle loads up to 15,000 pounds; 72-inch cover is required for railroads. However, ground cover is not to exceed 72 inches unless approved by the pipeline operator.
Pipeline Safety Data and Trendsin the United States
Pipeline safety data are compiled by the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) of the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT).OPS maintains the Natural Gas Gathering and Transmission Systems Incident Database, OPS requires natural gas pipeline operators to report each failure that results in fatalities, injuries that require in-patient hospitalization, property damage (including cost of gas lost, of the operator or others, or both) of $50,000 or more, or ignition of gas (49 CFR 191.3, amended in 2001). Some pipeline product releases go undocumented because they do not meet the federal requirements for reporting. This results in an underreporting of releases and impacts.
TABLE B-5Natural Gas Transmission/Gathering Systems—Cause of Onshore Incidents, 1985–2001
Cause
Pipelines
Nonpipeline (%) Facilities (%)
Total (%)
Third-party damage
28
9
23
External corrosion
17
0
13
Internal corrosion
11
7
10
Natural forces
10
8
9
Miscellaneous
2
30
9
Incorrect operation
3
19
7
Unknown
7
5
6
Other failure
4
8
5
Construction/installation
6
1
5
Manufacturer
6
–
4
Previously damaged pipe
4
0
3
Malfunction
1
11
3
Stress corrosion cracking
2
–
2
Vandalism
–
1
1
Total
100
100
100
NOTE: These data are based on 662 incidents.
SOURCE: Trench and Selig 2003.
By 1999–2001, the average annual consumption of natural gas had increased 29 percent to 21.8 tcf per year. For the same time period, the average annual number of safety incidents dropped to 63 and the number of reportable safety incidents per year per tcf dropped by 40 percent to 3.4.
In 2001, there were 7 transportation fatalities which were attributable to natural gas pipeline incidents. In 2002, the number of transportation fatalities related to natural gas pipeline incidents was 10 (NTSB 2003).In 2007, 11 pipeline fatalities were reported and in 2008 there were 6 according to a news release from the National Transportation Safety Board on, 24 Sep 2009 http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2009/2007_2008%20fatality%20stats%2024sep09.pdf
APPENDIX C Overview of the Transmission Pipeline
Industry and Its Regulation
The long-distance transport of natural gas was not technologically possible until 1925. Thus its commercial use did not develop as rapidly as did that of refined petroleum. Major expansion of the natural gas transmission pipeline system began after World War II when large crude oil trunk lines were converted for natural gas (Congressional Research Service 1986), and pipelines now transport nearly all of the nation’s natural gas.
This appendix provides a description of the economic structure and regulation of the natural gas and liquids pipeline industry, including an overview of the size and diversity of the industry, the way in which tariffs are set, and financial incentives. Many agencies have a role in pipeline regulation, and various new safety-related programs and regulations have been or are in the process of being implemented. The programs, however, stop short of managing land use to increase safety because the national agencies do not have regulatory authority in these areas.
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND REGULATION
Natural Gas Pipeline Industry--Structure of the Industry
Natural gas is transported in about 180,000 miles of transmission lines ranging from 20 to 42 inches in diameter. These pipelines are designed to operate at high pressures that generally range from 500 to 1,000 pounds per square inch. Natural gas transmission pipelines are primarily interstate, larger-diameter pipes constructed of carbon steel, engineered and constructed to meet standards established by the American Petroleum Institute and adopted by the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT).
If a relatively small quantity of natural gas leaks from a crack, flaw, or damaged section of the pipeline, a serious incident may not result if repairs are made in a timely manner. However, if a natural gas transmission line fails catastrophically, there is usually an initial explosion that can injure or kill people in the vicinity and cause extensive property damage. The escaping product continues to burn until the supply is shut off. Restructuring of the natural gas industry has resulted in a change in contracting as well.
During the 1980s, pipeline companies and their customers were burdened with costs resulting from take-or-pay provisions in gas procurement contracts. A producer sold natural gas under a long-term contract, usually lasting 20 years or more, to a pipeline company.In the 1980s, the effects of take-or-pay provisions were significantly reduced. Under FERC Order 636, which went into effect November 1, 1993, interstate pipeline companies were required to unbundle or separate the sales and transportation services of natural gas. While Order 636 resulted in reduced pipeline revenues (although not necessarily profitability), the new method of setting rates allowed pipeline companies to collect most of their costs in fixed demand charges, which reduced the risk of recovering these costs and permitted the creation of new transportation and marketing services that have improved the efficiency of the overall natural gas transportation process. While rates are not regulated directly, FERC reviews the filed tariffs of pipeline companies to ensure that they are just and reasonable and nondiscriminating. In instances where a pipeline system has no competition, FERC may set rates by using a traditional public utility accounting regulatory format (Kumins 2001).
New transmission lines are continuing to be built to meet projected demand. Pipeline construction data indicate that material accounts for 37 percent, labor for 39 percent, right-of-way and damages for 4 percent, and miscellaneous costs for 20 percent of total construction costs. Miscellaneous expenses include engineering, supervision, administration and overhead, interest, contingencies, and filing fees (Kennedy 1993). In 1990, data indicated that natural gas pipeline construction cost ranged from about $200,000 per mile for an 8-inch-diameter pipeline to $1.2 million per mile for a 42-inch-diameter pipeline.
Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS)
The distribution of pipeline regulatory responsibility has evolved since the enactment of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, which was the first legislation to require OPS to establish minimum federal safety standards for interstate natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines. The interstate commerce clause was broadly interpreted in this act so that federal regulations extended to intrastate as well as interstate natural gas pipelines.Regulation of the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of natural gas and hazardous liquids pipelines is primarily a federal responsibility, a federal–state partnership is encouraged (Pennsylvania does not participate in regulating transmission or gathering gas lines).Because pipeline operators face different risks depending on such factors as location and product being transported in the pipeline, OPS began exploring the concept of a risk-based approach to pipeline safety in the mid-1990s.OPS has moved forward with the Integrity Management Program. The program for hazardous liquids pipelines allows pipeline operators flexibility to design and implement the program on the basis of pipeline-specific conditions and risks.
The final rule for integrity management of natural gas transmission pipelines in high-consequence areas [published on December 15, 2003 (68 Federal Register 69778)] went into effect in February 2004. This rule requires operators of natural gas transmission pipelines to develop integrity management programs for pipelines located where a leak or rupture could do the most harm (i.e., could affect high-consequence areas).The rule requires gas transmission pipeline operators to perform ongoing assessments of pipeline integrity; to improve data collection, integration, and analysis; to repair and remediate the pipeline as necessary; and to implement preventive and mitigative actions. For natural gas transmission pipelines, OPS is developing a definition that focuses on populated areas (GAO 2002; Cycla Corporation 2004). The definition of a high-consequence area may require additional protection for people with limited mobility such as inhabitants of day care centers, old age homes, and prisons (C-FER Technologies 2000).USDOT and FERC signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Natural Gas Transportation Facilities, dated January 15, 1993, giving USDOT exclusive authority to promulgate federal safety standards used in the transportation of natural gas.
APPENDIX D Risk Assessment Techniquesin the Pipeline Industry
During the past two decades, emphasis on pipeline safety has shifted from response to prevention of accidents.Preventive actions have included greater levels of inspection and use of various risk assessment techniques affecting the probability of pipeline failure (e.g., internal corrosion, external corrosion, pipeline loading) or on the consequences of rupture (such as heat intensity, thermal impact radius, depth of cover).Recently, the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) implemented —the Integrity Management Program—that establishes new testing, repair, and mitigation requirements for transmission pipelines and requires pipeline companies to use a risk-based approach for pipeline safety program, as a first step, operators will be required to perform risk assessments on each of their pipeline segments in high-consequence areas. Inspections will be performed by the use of in-line inspection tools, analysis of operating and maintenance records, and direct examination of pipe in selected areas.